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Abstract
This Essay will mainly deal with the administrative jurisdiction, but to the extent that it is
relevant, will also pay attention to civil suits as well, in a national context as in the Union. The
Essay will describe the development of the case-law of the Court of Justice concerning the ex
officio application of Community law, starting with the well-known van Schijndel & van Veen v.
Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten and Peterbroeck, Van Campenhout & Cie SCS v.
Belgian State cases of December 14, 1995 and ending with the van der Weerd & Others v. Minister
van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit case of June 7, 2006. The latter case seems to contain,
at least presently, the final conclusion of the relevant case-law. The van der Weerd judgment also
deserves special attention because it has a rather peculiar background in Dutch administrative law.
Part I of this Essay will briefly describe the van Schijndel and Peterbroeck cases; Part II will
discuss cases which are based on the aims and interests of a rule of Community law, such as Eco
Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International NV.; Part III will draw a number of interim
conclusions in the form of a kind of “checklist”; Part IV will analyze the van der Weerd case, and
after having raised in Part V a number of remaining questions I will draw some final conclusions.
The main question in this Essay will be whether, with the judgment in the van der Weerd case, the
development of the case-law in this particular field has been finally concluded.
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INTRODUCTION
The application of Community law by national courts ex of-
ficio, or of their own motion, is a highly debated issue in the
Netherlands.1 I would like to define "application ex officio" as the
application of a rule of Community law which has not been men-
tioned by one of the parties and falls outside the scope of the
dispute. It has to be distinguished from what is called ex officio
completion of the legal grounds of appeal, i.e., that the court within
the limits of the dispute supplements the legal grounds which
have been submitted by one of the parties. The latter form of ex
officio judicial action has been expressly laid down in Article
8:69(2) of the General Administrative Law Act, which reads:
"The district court shall supplement the legal basis on its own
initiative." 2
This Essay will mainly deal with the administrative jurisdic-
tion, but to the extent that it is relevant, will also pay attention to
civil suits as well, in a national context as in the Union. The
Essay will describe the development of the case-law of the Court
ofJustice concerning the ex officio application of Community law,
starting with the well-known van Schijndel & van Veen v. Stichting
Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten and Peterbroeck, Van Campenhout
& Cie SCS v. Belgian State cases of December 14, 1995 and ending
with the van der Weerd & Others v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuur
en Voedselkwaliteit case of June 7, 2006. The latter case seems to
contain, at least presently, the final conclusion of the relevant
case-law. The van der Weerdjudgment also deserves special atten-
tion because it has a rather peculiar background in Dutch ad-
ministrative law. Part I of this Essay will briefly describe the van
Schijndel and Peterbroeck cases; Part II will discuss cases which are
based on the aims and interests of a rule of Community law, such
as Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International NV.; Part III
* Member of the Dutch Council of State. The opinions in this paper are not nec-
essarily those of the Council; they are the exclusive responsibility of the author.
1. See, e.g.,J.H. JANS ET AL., EuROPEANISATION OF PuBLIc LAw 308-16 (2007).
2. General Administrative Law Act art. 8:69 (1994) (Neth.).
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will draw a number of interim conclusions in the form of a kind
of "checklist"; Part IV will analyze the van der Weerd case, and
after having raised in Part V a number of remaining questions I
will draw some final conclusions. The main question in this Es-
say will be whether, with the judgment in the van der Weerd case,
the development of the case-law in this particular field has been
finally concluded.
I. THE VAN SCHIJNDEL AND PETERBROECK CASES
In van Schijndel,3 a civil case, two physiotherapists who did
not wish to adhere to a mandatory retirement schedule, set up
on the initiative of the government, brought an appeal against a
retirement fund to pay the premium for their retirement insur-
ance. It was, however, only during the last stage of the proceed-
ings before the Dutch Supreme Court, that they argued that
their mandatory participation in the schedule under considera-
tion violated EC competition law rules.4 The Supreme Court ini-
tially considered that it could not address this issue, because it
had to accept the facts of the case as they have been established
by the lower court or tribunal. It therefore requested from the
European Court of Justice ("ECJ" or the "Court") a preliminary
ruling, first about the question of whether it was obliged to apply
the rules of European competition law ex officio; if so, secondly,
whether the Supreme Court was bound to apply the rules of
competition law "if in so doing the court would have to abandon
the passive role assigned to it."'
The Court's answer to the first question declared that the
national court is obliged to apply the rules of European competi-
tion law ex officio when the national court has by virtue of its do-
mestic law the obligation to raise, or even only the power to
raise, similar rules of domestic law.6 Regarding the second ques-
tion, the ECJ postulated that "it is for the domestic legal system
of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals hav-
ing jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules
governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals de-
3. van Schijndel & van Veen v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten,
Joined Cases C-430 & 431/93, [1995] E.C.R 1-4705.
4. See id. 10.
5. Id. 12(2).
6. Id. 15.
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rive from the direct effect of Community law,"7 thus adopting
the so-called principle of national procedural autonomy. However,
the Court added that the following two requirements have to be
met: a) the rules of procedure "must not be less favourable than
those governing similar domestic actions" (so-called principle of
equivalence); and b) they should not "render virtually impossi-
ble or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by
Community law" (so-called principle of effectiveness).
Concerning this second requirement, the ECJ indicated
that the national court should examine whether a national rule
of procedure which renders application of Community law im-
possible or excessively difficult-and for that reason should be
left out of account ex officio-could be justified by "the basic
principles of the domestic judicial system, such as protection of
the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the
proper conduct of procedure," 8-the so-called procedural rule
of reason. The Court of Justice then applied this procedural
rule of reason to the circumstances of the appeal before the Su-
preme Court and concluded that Community law did not re-
quire the Supreme Court to abandon its "passive role," thus an-
swering the second question referred in the negative.'
The ECJ judgment in Peterbroeck reached the opposite con-
clusion. 10 In this case the question was whether in a tax assess-
ment procedure the national (Belgian) court should apply a rule
of Community law ex officio when a national rule of procedure
prohibited the application of Community law because the appel-
lant had not raised an appeal based upon the Community rule
within a very short period (sixty days). The ECJ in Peterbroeck
considered that the national procedural rule could not be justi-
fied by "legal certainty or the proper conduct of procedure."'"
II. ECO SWISS AND THE CONSUMER DIRECTIVES CASES
In subsequent case-law, two new elements have been intro-
duced, namely (a) public order and (b) consumer protection.
7. Id. 17.
8. Id. 19.
9. Id. 11 21-22.
10. See Peterbroeck, Van Campenhout & Cie SCS v. Belgian State, Case C-312/93,
[1995] E.C.R. 14599.
11. Id. 1 20.
2008] 1163
1164 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 31:1161
A. Public Order
The notion of public policy-highly relevant in the field of
application ex officio-played an important role in the Eco Swiss
case. 12 The Dutch Supreme Court asked whether it should an-
nul an arbitral award which violated Article 81 of the Treaty Es-
tablishing the European Community ("EC Treaty")," although
this provision had not been mentioned during the arbitral pro-
cedure. According to Article 1065 of the Dutch Code of Civil
Procedure, annulment is possible if the award had been contrary
to public policy. 4
The Court of Justice replied that Article 81 constitutes a
"fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplish-
ment of the tasks entrusted to the Community and, in particular,
for the functioning of the internal market."1 5 The arbitral award
should therefore be annulled on account of a failure to observe
a national rule that had the status of public policy. The Court
left unclear whether Article 81 is only a rule of public policy in
proceedings for the judicial review of arbitral awards or also
outside that particular context. The latter interpretation ap-
pears to be the right one, because subsequently the Court held
in Manfredi, Cannito, Tricarico & Murgolo v. Lloyd Adriatico As-
sicurazioni SpA, Fondiaria Sai SpA & Assitalia SpA with reference
to Eco Swiss that "Articles 81 EC and 82 EC are a matter of public
policy which must be automatically applied by national courts."1 6
B. Consumer Protection
The Court has considered consumer protection issues in
the cases Ociano Grupo Editorial SA v. Roci6 Murciano Quintero,
Cofidis SA v. Jean-Louis Fredout and Elisa Maria Mostaza Claro v.
Centro M6vil Milenium SL. 17 In the first two cases the Court de-
12. Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int'l NV, Case C-126/97, [1999] E.C.R.
1-3055.
13. Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community art.
81, O.J. C 321 E/37, at E/73 (2006).
14. See Eco Swiss, [1999] E.C.R. 1-3055, 7(1) (e).
15. Id. 36.
16. Manfredi, Cannito, Tricarico & Murgolo v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA,
Fondiaria Sai SpA & Assitalia SpA, Joined Cases C-295-98/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-6619,
31.
17. Elisa Marfa Mostaza Claro v. Centro M6vil Milenium SL, Case C-168/05,
[2006] E.C.R. 1-10421; Cofidis SA v.Jean-Louis Fredout, Case C-473/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-
10875; Oc~ano Grupo Editorial SA v. Roci6 Murciano Quintero (C-240/98) & Salvat
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cided that the national court must, of its own motion, examined
the applicability of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in con-
sumer contracts. In the Elisa Claro case, the claim that an arbi-
tration clause in a mobile telephone contract should be consid-
ered invalid on account of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive
had only been raised after the termination of the arbitration
proceedings."8 The Court initially repeated its previously de-
cided doctrines concerning the principles of procedural auton-
omy, equivalence and effectiveness, and then cited the Ociano
and Codifis judgments, which had held that a national court
should ex officio examine whether a particular clause has to be
qualified as unfair.
Finally, even Eco Swiss appeared on the stage when the
Court declared that:
[W]here its domestic rules of procedure require a national
court to grant an application for annulment of an arbitration
award where such an application is founded on failure to ob-
serve national rules of public policy, it must also grant such
an application where it is founded on failure to comply with
Community rules of this type.1 9
Without stating in so many words that Article 6(1), of the Direc-
tive, or even the Directive in its entirety, is a rule of public policy,
its conclusion is that the Directive requires:
[T]hat a national court seised of an action for annulment of
an arbitration award must determine whether the arbitration
agreement is void and annul that award where that agree-
ment contains an unfair term, even though the consumer has
not pleaded that invalidity in the course of the arbitration
proceedings, but only in that of an action for annulment. 2°
In these judgments the Court examines the aim and the in-
terest of the rule of Community law involved, 21 as well as
whether a rule of Community law may be qualified as a rule of
European public policy. In his conclusions in the Elisa Claro
Editores SA v. Josd M. Sdnchez Alc6n Prades (C-241/98), Jost Luis Copano Badillo (C-
242/98), Mohammed Berroane (C-243/98)& Emilio Vifias Felid (C-244/98), Joined
Cases C-240-44/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-4941.
18. See Mostaza Claro, [2006] E.C.R. 1-10421.
19. Id. 35.
20. Id. 39.
21. Compare M. Verhoeven, S.E.W. 2007 pp. 121-23, case-note under Mostaza Claro,
[2006] E.C.R. 1-10421.
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case, Attorney General Tizzano argued that a rule of European
public policy had been violated, namely the right of the defence.
As I have already remarked, the Court in that case did not, how-
ever, expressly qualify the Directive, nor indeed the principle of
Community law cited by the Attorney General, as embodying
public policy.
III. INTERIM CONCLUSIONS BEFORE THE
VAN DER WEERD CASE
Limiting myself to the procedure before an administrative
court, in my view, if a rule of Community law which has not been
raised by one of the parties may have an influence on the out-
come of the dispute, the national court should apply the follow-
ing "checklist":
a. When the rule of Community law involved falls within the
scope of the dispute: the court should examine whether
the factual and/or legal grounds of appeal may be sup-
plemented by it, representing a so-called ex officio comple-
tion of the legal-grounds of appeal.22
b. When the Community law issue has not been mentioned
and is located outside the scope of the dispute:
Is the rule involved a rule of Community public policy? As
Eco Swiss leaves room for doubt on this point, the only case on
point is Manfredi, but its rather sweeping statement about the
public policy character of EC Treaty Articles 81 and 82 is not
fully convincing. Note that, according to Dutch legal doctrine,
national competition law is not deemed to form a part of the
rules of public policy.
If national law obliges the court to raise of its own motion a
similar rule of domestic law, then the provision of Community
law involved should be applied likewise; the same applies when
the court is only empowered to raise of its own motion the simi-
lar rule of Community law. In fact, as will come back later on,
Dutch administrative courts are only obliged to apply their na-
tional law ex officio when the competence of the court or of the
decision-making body and/or the admissibility of the appellant
is concerned. Accordingly, rules of Community law which cover
22. General Administrative Law Act art. 8:69 (1994) (Neth.).
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the same subject should be applied ex officio, based upon the so-
called principle of equivalence.
If the national court is not obliged or empowered to apply a
similar rule of national law ex officio, would the refusal to apply
the rule of Community law involved render virtually impossible
or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Com-
munity law, applying the so-called principle of effectiveness?23
In that event the national court should pay attention to the
place of the rule of national procedural law involved, i.e. the one
which would prohibit ex officio application, in the procedure, its
progress and its special features, viewed as a whole before the
various national instances. Naturally, the basic principles of the
domestic judicial system, such as the protection of the rights of
the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper con-
duct of procedure, should be taken into account, applying the
so-called procedural rule of reason. 24
These are the questions that an administrative court should
ask itself. In practice, however, most cases can be solved with the
aid of the answer to question (a), provided that the limits of the
dispute are interpreted rather broadly.
IV. THE VAN DER WEERD CASE 25
A. The Facts of the Case
In February 2001, an epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease
was declared in the Netherlands. At that time, the appellants in
the main proceedings ("the appellants") were in charge of cat-
tle-breeding holdings which were situated less than two kilome-
tres from the holding which had been declared to be infected by
foot-and-mouth disease by the Director of the Rijksdienst voor
de keuring van Vee en Vlees ("RVV") (the national cattle and
meat inspection service). The Director's decision was based
upon the result of tests carried out by the ID-Lelystad B.V. labo-
ratory. Subsequently, the Director decided to order vaccination
followed by the slaughter of all biungulate animals on the hold-
ings of the appellants.
23. See van Schijndel & van Veen v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiother-
apeuten, Joined Cases C-430 & 431/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-4705, 17.
24. See id. 19.
25. van der Weerd & Others v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en
Voedselkwaliteit, Joined Cases C-222-25/05, [20071 E.C.R. 1-4233.
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After having lodged objections to the decisions of the Direc-
tor, who rejected them as unfounded, the appellants brought
proceedings before the national court, the College van Beroep
voor het bedrijfsleven ("CBB") (Trade and Industry Appeals Tri-
bunal), challenging the decisions taken by the Director. The
CBB rejected all pleas which had been submitted. However, it
pointed out that in related cases before it26 the validity of similar
decisions had been challenged on the basis of different pleas in
law which had not been raised by the appellants. Those pleas
had claimed that the Director was not entitled to take measures
on the basis of the results of the tests carried out by ID-Lelystad
B.V., because the laboratory involved is not mentioned in Annex
B of Directive 85/511/EEC (11).
The CBB held that those pleas might have an influence on
the resolution of van der Weerd's appeal, but could not be taken
into account as they were not raised before it. In its holding, the
CBB made the (usual) distinction between: a) the duty to sup-
plement pleas in law which have been submitted by the appel-
lants and stay within the limits of the dispute, i.e. ex officio comple-
tion of the legal grounds of appeal;27 as contrasted with b) an analy-
sis which the court is required to make on its own initiative
outside the scope of the dispute, i.e. ex officio application. Ac-
cording to Dutch administrative law, such an analysis is only re-
quired in cases involving the application of rules relating to the
powers of administrative bodies and those of the court itself, and
provisions as to admissibility. The CBB considered that the Eu-
ropean Community ("EC") law issue could not be considered to
fall under (a) above, while item (b) only concerned rules of pub-
lic policy, to which, according to the CBB, the Directive did not
belong. The CBB accordingly asked the ECJ whether Commu-
nity law required that it should examine EC law rules which were
outside the terms of the dispute, in particular those derived
from Directive 85/511.
B. The Judgment of the Court ofJustice
The main part of the Court's judgment is constituted by
paragraphs 28 to 33 which merit quotation:
26. See Dokter & W. Boekhout v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwal-
iteit, Case C-28/05, [2006] E.C.R. 1-5431.
27. General Administrative Law Act art. 8:69(2) (1994) (Neth.).
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28. It is clear from the case-law that, in the absence of Com-
munity rules in the field, it is for the domestic legal sys-
tem of each Member State to designate the courts and
tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the de-
tailed rules governing actions for safeguarding rights
which individuals derive from Community law, pro-
vided, first, that such rules are not less favourable that
those governing similar domestic actions (principle of
equivalence) and, secondly, that they do not render vir-
tually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of
rights conferred by Community law (principle of effec-
tiveness) (Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van
Schijndel and van Veen 1995 ECR 1-4705, paragraph 17,
and Case C-129/00 Commission v Italy 2003 ECR
1-14637, paragraph 25).
29. As regards the principle of equivalence, it is clear from
the order for reference that the College van Beroep
voor het bedrijfsleven is competent to raise of its own
motion issues relating to the infringement of rules of
public policy, which are construed in Dutch law as
meaning issues concerning the powers of administrative
bodies and those of the court itself, and provisions as to
admissibility. Those rules lie at the very basis of the na-
tional procedures, since they define the conditions in
which those provisions may be initiated and the authori-
ties which have the power, within their area of responsi-
bility, to determine the extent of the rights and obliga-
tions of individuals.
30. The provisions of Directive 85/511 which are at issue do
not occupy a similar position within the Community le-
gal order. They govern neither the conditions in which
procedures relating to the control of foot-and-mouth
disease may be initiated nor the authorities which have
the power, within their area of responsibility, to deter-
mine the extent of the rights and obligations of individ-
uals.
31. Those provisions cannot therefore be considered as be-
ing equivalent to the national rules of public policy re-
ferred to above. As a result, the application of the prin-
ciple of equivalence does not mean, as regards the pre-
sent cases, that the national court is obliged to conduct
of its own motion an examination of the validity of the
administrative measures in question by having regard to
criteria based on Directive 85/511.
2008] 1169
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32. Moreover, were those provisions to form part of public
health policy, they would have been put forward in the
main proceedings essentially in order to take account of
the private interests of individuals who had been the ob-
ject of measures to control foot-and-mouth disease.
33. As regards the principle of effectiveness, it is clear from
the Court's case-law that each case which raises the ques-
tion whether a national procedural provision renders
the exercise of rights conferred by the Community legal
order on individuals impossible or excessively difficult
must be analysed by reference to the role of that provi-
sion in the procedure, its progress and its special fea-
tures, viewed as a whole, before the various national in-
stances. In that context, it is necessary to take into con-
sideration, where relevant, the principles which lie at
the basis of the national legal system, such as the protec-
tion of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal
certainty and the proper conduct of the proceedings
(see, to that effect, Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck 1995
ECR 14599, paragraph 14, and Van Schijndel and van
Veen, paragraph 19).28
As the quoted text shows, the Court started in paragraph 28
with a summary of its earlier case-law regarding the principles of
national procedural autonomy, equivalence and effectiveness.29
As far as the principle of equivalence is concerned, the Court
held in paragraphs 30-31 that Directive 85/511 does not contain
any rules of public policy. Thus, the principle of equivalence
does not apply here, because the principle does not go further
than the obligation or the power to apply rules of national law ex
officio when they are based upon public policy. ° The Court's
somewhat puzzling paragraph 32 states that:
[W]ere those provisions [of Directive 85/511 which are at is-
sue] to form part of public health policy, they would have
been put forward in the main proceedings essentially in order
to take account of the private interests of individuals who had
been the object of measures to control foot-and-mouth dis-
ease.
31
This paragraph gives some ground to the view that the Direc-
28. Id. 91 28-33.
29. See id. 28 (referring to van Schijndel [1995] E.C.R. 1-4705, 1 17).
30. See id. 30-31; see also supra Part III.
31. van der Weerd, [2007] E.C.R. 14233, 32.
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tive's provisions could sometimes be considered to protect pub-
lic health and might then reach the level of European public
policy.
As regards the principle of effectiveness discussed in para-
graph 33, the Court repeated the procedural rule of reason as it
has been formulated in the van Schijndel case. 2 The Court then
pointed out that in the van Schijndel case it had to deal with a
principle of national law which provided that the national court
had to stay within the limits of the dispute and had to base its
decision on the facts put before it. The Court then deemed that
limitation to be justified on account of the protection of the
rights of the defence and in the interest of a proper conduct of
proceedings. 3
According to the CBB, the procedural circumstances in the
present case did not differ from those which were the subject of
van Schijndel, the only point of difference being that the court in
the van Schijndel case (the Supreme Court of the Netherlands) is
a court of last instance, while the CBB is a court of first and last
instance. The Court of Justice did not consider that distinction
sufficient to deviate in the present case from the principles
which had been reached in van Schijndel.34
The Court finally dealt with the question whether other cir-
cumstances might lead to a different result. As far as Peterbroeck
is concerned, the applicant in the main proceedings had been
deprived of the opportunity to rely effectively on the incompati-
bility of a domestic provision with Community law. Ociano,
Cofidis and Elisa Claro all found their basis in the need for con-
sumer protection, while Eco Swiss formed an application of the
principle of equivalence (and not of the principle of effective-
ness); pleas based on national law and those based on Commu-
nity law should be treated equally.35
V. QUESTIONS REMINING AFTER VAN DER WEERD
Some might consider that with van der Weerd all issues con-
cerning national court's ex officio application of EC rules have
32. See id. 9 33; see also van Schijndel, [1995] E.C.R. 14705, 19.
33. See van der Weerd, [2007] E.C.R. 14233, 9 35.
34. See id. 9 38.
35. See id. It 39-40; see also R. Ortlep & M. Verhoeven, S.E.W. 2007 pp. 516-18,
case-note under van der Weerd, [2007] E.C.R. 1-4233.
2008] 1171
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been definitively solved. Furthermore I have the impression that
the "interim conclusions" which I have presented above still
hold. But nonetheless, I would raise the following questions.
About the principle of equivalence: is it possible that the
Court of Justice might reach a different result than in van der
Weerd, based upon its appraisal of the high importance of the
rule of Community law involved, although it does not relate to
the competence of the administration of the court nor to the
admissibility of the claimant, in effect making the Community
law rule one of the level of a rule of European public order?
The example is Eco Swiss where Article 81 was qualified as a rule
of such importance that it had to be applied in the same way as a
national rule of public order.
A further step would be to consider a rule of Community or
Union law as reaching the level of a rule of European public
policy which for that reason only has to be applied by a national
court of its own motion. In Dutch legal literature a reference
has been made to the distinction known in French civil law, be-
tween the "ordre public de direction" (public policy and the general
interest) and the "ordre public de protection" (public policy and the
private interest). In paragraph 32 of the van der Weerd case the
Court seems to leave open the possibility that national courts
might have to apply the first mentioned rules of their own mo-
tion "irrespective of the importance of that provision to the
Community legal order." 6
As far as the principle of effectiveness is concerned, one
might wonder about the compatibility with Community law of a
rule in Dutch administrative law stipulating that the court of first
and final instance should not take into account rules of Commu-
nity law which have not been raised by the appellant during the
previous administrative stage. According to van der Weerd the
parties should have had a "genuine opportunity to raise a plea
based on Community law before a national court. ''- T
Finally, I would like to draw the attention of the reader to
Article 9(1) of the Treaty of Lisbon which reads as follows:
Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure ef-
36. Id. 41.
37. Id.
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fective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.3 8
Although this rule is a codification of existing case-law, it should
have a stimulating effect upon the willingness of national courts
to apply Community or Union law ex officio. As far as the posi-
tion of administrative jurisdiction itself is concerned, one should
not neglect that by the removal of the Third Pillar of the Union
and the inclusion of its subject-matter in the first one, the role of
administrative courts may increase.
CONCLUSION
My Essay had a threefold objective: to describe the develop-
ment of relevant case-law; to elucidate the aspects of Dutch ad-
ministrative law which are relevant for a proper understanding
of the van der Weerd case; and to answer the question whether
with van der Weerd the development of the case-law has been fi-
nally concluded.
The answer to this question should in my view be in the
negative, but I have to admit that future case-law will probably be
characterized by fine-tuning. The basic sounds of this piece of
music have been very well composed indeed.
38. Treaty of Lisbon (Reform Treaty) art. 9, O.J. C 306/01 (2007), signed on Dec.
13, 2007 (not yet ratified).
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